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THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF
1966: NHSB DRIVER LICENSING
STANDARD- POWER NOT USED
By JOHN H. REESE*
This article is concerned with the Highway Safety Act of 1966
and the administration of the provisions of that Act by the National
Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB). After a discussion of the coverage
of the Act, Professor Reese assesses its constitutionality along with a
consideration of the pre-emptive intent of Congress as evidenced by the
enactment. The focus of the article then shifts to the NHSB and its
philisophical approach in administering the Act. The effects of this
approach are exemplified in the "Driver Licensing Standards." Al-
though this is only one of the NHSB's areas of responsibility, Professor
Reese points out that the philosophy has led to "non-standards" in this
area, partially thwarting the intent of Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONALLY, highway safety has been viewed as a local
problem, primarily subject to state authority. Some groups con-
tended that highway safety was a local concern as a matter of "states'
rights" and seemed to give little attention to analysis of the nature of
the problem to determine how governments - state and federal-
could best attack it.'
I See, e.g., Foreword to NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND OmDI-
NANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE (1962):
It is generally agreed that achieving uniformity in traffic laws across the Nation
is properly a task of the States, not the Federal government. Numerous national
conferences on street and highway safety, many Federal and State officials,
and informed laymen in the traffic safety field, have taken the position that
centralization of highway traffic control in the Federal government is undesir-
able; that under our constitutional concepts, this control is primarily the respon-
sibility of the States, and that uniform traffic regulation should have its
foundation in uniform State laws. A basic tenet of the Uniform Vehicle Code
is its approach through voluntary cooperative State action.
Id. at IV; accord, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) (THE FEDERAL
ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY); Hearings on S. 1467 Before the Subcomm. on Public Roads
of the Comm. on Public Works - Authorization Bill for Highway Beautification Wsd
Highway Safety Programs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1967) (statement of Lewis P.
Spitz, Executive Director, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators)
(hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1467). There are those who regard the 1966 federal
1970
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However, this "local problem" premise has been rejected, and
highway safety is now viewed as a national problem; for in 1966,
Congress lost patience with the attempts of state governments to create
effective highway safety programs. 2 After at least forty years of exhor-
tation to cooperate and to structure uniform and comprehensive safety
programs,3 the states remained divided in their approaches to the
problem. State highway safety programs were extremely diverse as to
intervention as an improper intrusion. See Hearings on S. 3052 Before the Subcomm. on
Public Roads of the Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 148-50 (1966) (state-
ment of Charles F. Schwan, Jr., Director, Washington Office of Council of State Gov-
ernments); Compare Hearings on S. 1467 supra referring to implied consent standard
promulgated:
The specificity of this particular standard severely limits the options available
to a State legislature and practically dictates what the State legislature must do.
In effect the National Highway Safety Agency is telling the state legislature
what it must do in order to comply - pass implied consent legislation and also
reduce blood alcohol percentage . . . I am saying here you are limiting very
much the area in which a State legislature may want to operate....
Id. at 288 (statement of David J. Allen, Administrative Assistant to the Governor of
Indiana) with statement of John De Lorenzi, Managing Director, Public and Govern-
ment Relations, American Automobile Association. Id. at 222.
2The congressional attitude is subtly revealed in the Hearings on S. 3052 Before the
Subcomm. on Public Roads of the Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
(hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 30521. It is stated, for example: "Our survey of
present highway safety efforts throughout the Nation clearly shows that Federal, State,
and local efforts have proceeded separately with little or no coordination and that major
gaps and weaknesses exist in present programs. Id. at 7 (statement of John T. Connor,
Secretary of Commerce). More specific is H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966):
The Committee on Public Works maintained diligent contact with the Depart-
ment of Commerce, anxious to learn what progress the Secretary was making
in his conferences with the States for the development of standards for the
voluntary highway safety programs the amended section 135 encouraged the
States to establish. [Baldwin Amendment] There was no real prograss ...
For 40 years the various safety-related organizations, both public and private,
have been trying to persuade the several State legislatures to adopt at least
minimum uniform regulatory statutes, with lamentable lack of success.
Id. at 4, 6.
3 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
It should also be noted that when he was Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover called
a large number of interested groups to attend a National Conference on Street and High-
way Safety. Eight study committees were at work on the problem for six months in
advance of the Conference. Findings and a consolidated report were prepared by the
Conference after its deliberations. In 1926, the Conference was convened again to con-
sider interim work of committees. The 1926 Conference approved a suggested model for
a "uniform vehicle code," which had been prepared by the Committee on Uniformity
of Laws and Regulations. This "code" consisted of three separate acts covering (1)
registration and certificate of title, (2) licensing of operators and chauffeurs, and (3)
rules governing the operation of vehicles on highways. The three acts were recommended
to the states for adoption. These documents were later combined into a UNIFORM
VEHICLE CODE, likewise recommended to the states. It has been maintained and amended
through the years and is currently in the custodianship of the National Committee on
Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. It was last revised in 1968. H.R. Doc. No. 93,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1959) (THE FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY). In
the interim, in 1926 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the act covering licensing of operators and chauffeurs under the title "Uniform
Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act" and recommended it to the
states. It was revised in 1930. However, in 1943 the Conference of Commissioners de-
clared it "obsolete" and "'no longer recommended for adoption." HANDBOOK OF THE




areas of coverage; and where coverage was similar, standards were often
different.
4
In his 1966 Transportation Message to the Congress, 5 the President
described motor vehicle accident losses in lives, personal injury, and
property damage as a national problem, second in magnitude only to
the Viet Nam War.' His characterizations seemed to provide the catalyst
which quickly produced a congressional consensus that the federal
government should intervene. Congress recognized that it was fallacious
to perceive highway accidents as merely local problems and concluded
that the existing piecemeal methods of regulation were not a sensible
manner in which to attack the highway safety problem, even if the
problem is arguably local in nature.7 Hence, Congress concerned itself
with developing legislation which would combine two premises: (1)
that highway safety is a national concern and (2) that all facets of
the highway transportation system having a safety implication must be
dealt with systematically. Therefore, vehicle, roadway, and driver would
receive attention in terms of their relation to the safety aspects of
"highway transportation."
8
I. THE HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF 1966
The most extensive federal involvement in the highway safety
field occurred with the passage of the Highway Safety Act of 1966.'
4The diversity as to both coverage and standards is apparent upon cursory examination
of the volumes in the series entitled TRAFFIC LAWS ANNUAL, published by the National
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. See also H.R. REP. No. 1700,
89 Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
5 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1966, at 20.
Old.; accord, Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 82 (statement of Howard Pyle, Presi-
dent, National Safety Council).
7H.R. RaP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966);
S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6, 7, 15 (1966) (The Highway Safety Act
of 1966); accord, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 142, 145 (1959) (THE
FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY).
Id. See also Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 63-64 (statement of Herbert J. Bing-
ham, Executive Secretary, Tennessee Municipal League); 65 (statement of J.O. Mattson.
.President, Automotive Safety Foundation); 81-82 (statement of Howard Pyle, President,
National Safety Council); 116 (statement of William G. Johnson, General Manager,
National Safety Council); 162-63 (statement of William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Chair-
man, The President's Committee for Traffic Safety); 233 (statement of Senator Ran-
dolph, Committee Chairman).
923 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1970). At the federal level, the Bureau of Public Roads has
for years participated in creating and prescribing standards of highway design and con-
struction for federal-aid highways (initiated by the Federal Road Aid Act of July 11,
1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355). However, its historical responsibility does not include
control of human factors; hence, its operations are not to be considered. According to
49 U.S.C. § 1652(f)(4) (Supp. 1970), the Federal Highway Administrator is also
made Director of Public Roads. As such he controls human factors to the extent he
exercises the authority transferred to him from the Interstate Commerce Commission to
promulgate qualifications requirements of motor carrier operators. Until this transfer,
the Bureau had no human factors control power.
The Beamer Resolution of 1958 (Act of August 20, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-684,
72 Stat. 635) constituted advance Congressional consent to the creation of interstate
compacts between States in the field of highway and traffic safety, including driver
1970
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This Act vests authority in a federal administrative agency to assert
control over human factors relevant to highway accidents."°
A. Powers of the Secretary of Transportation and the National
Highway Safety Bureau
The provisions of the Act are to be administered by the Secretary
of Transportation acting through the National Highway Safety Bureau
(NHSB)." Although the Highway Safety Act deals with roadway
and driver factors, it does not confer upon the Secretary direct regu-
latory authority over individuals who operate motor vehicles. His power
is directed to the states as political entities. 12 Thus, the Secretary and
the NHSB do not engage in issuing or withdrawing drivers' licenses.
As will be seen, however, the manner in which the statutory program
is structured and the available sanctions imply that the Secretary's power
will be felt ultimately by individual licensees.
The essence of the Secretary's authority is contained in the follow-
ing expression:
Each State shall have a highway safety program approved by the Secre-
tary, designed to reduce traffic accidents and deaths, injuries, and
property damage resulting therefrom. Such programs shall be in
accordance with uniform standards promulgated by the Secretary.' 3
licensing and human factors research. However, this was essentially an enabling act to
permit states to act in concert using the compact device. Congressional approval is re'
quired by the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 10.
The Roberts Act of 1964 (Act of August 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-515, 78 Stat.
696) is not included in this analysis because it dealt with vehicle safety devices and
not human factors. Furthermore, although it did transfer power to the Administrator of
General Services, his authority to prescribe motor vehicle safety devices was limited to
vehicles purchased by GSA for government use.
The House version of the Baldwin Amendment (Act of August 28, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-139, 79 Stat. 578) to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1965 (23 U.S.C. 101
Supp. 1967) ) came close to transferring power to the Secretary of Commerce to cut off
federal highway funds to states which did not have approved highway safety programs.
However, this provision of the House Bill was stripped down to a statement that state
highway safety programs "should be in accordance with uniform standards approved
by the Secretary," as the bill was finally passed by the Congress (23 U.S.C. 135 (1964)).
Obviously, the power of the Secretary to cut off all highway funds to non-conforming
states was effectively eliminated.
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1425 (Supp. 1970)) is also not included. Although it builds on the theory of the
Roberts Act and transfers power to the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe mini-
mum motor vehicle performance standards for all motor vehicles manufactured for sale
or introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce in the interest of
public safety, it does not confer power of control over human factors to the NHSB.
Although there are other illustrations of federal government intervention in the
field of highway safety, this sampling should suffice to describe the sort of intervention
with which this analysis will not be concerned. This study constitutes an attempt to
evaluate the sort of involvement, which gives some organ of the federal government
power to devise the "law", i.e., the actual program policies which are brought to bear
directly or indirectly on individuals who operate motor vehicles.
10 23 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1970).
I1 49 U.S.C. § 1652(f)(2) (Supp. 1970).
12 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT
Acting through the NHSB, he is further directed to address the "uni-
form standards" to these goals:
[A] [T]o improve driver performance [including but not limited
to education, testing, examinations, and licensing and]
[B] [tjo improve pedestrian performance."14
More specifically the uniform standards are to include, but are not
limited to:
[1] [Aln effective record system of accidents (including injuries and
deaths resulting therefrom),
[2] accident investigations to determine the probable causes of acci-
dents, injuries and deaths,
[3] vehicle registration, operation, and inspection,
[4] highway design and maintenance (include lighting, markings, and
surface treatment),
[5] traffic control,
[6] vehicle codes and laws, [and]
[7] surveillance of traffic for detection and correction of high or
potentially high accident locations .... 1.5
Although these goals have been legislatively determined, the
Secretary's (NHSB) power to promulgate uniform standards on any
subject believed to be relevant to highway "safety" may render these
goals, in fact, illusory. To illustrate: There is abundant commentary
indicating that current highway "safety" knowledge is based upon
research which is nonempirical, or out-of-date, or both." Therefore,
it is submitted that the word "safety" is not precise and can mean
many things to many people. It is essentially a normative term which
is defined administratively, according to the NHSB's sense of values
and its conception of how much safety restriction is compatible with
efficient movement. If this analysis is correct, the NHSB effectively
determines the goals of the legislation as well as the standards by which
they are to be achieved.
In addition to the Secretary's authority to promulgate uniform
standards, he is empowered to "amend or waive standards" on a
"temporary basis" for the purpose of evaluating new or different
programs instituted by one or more states on an "experimental, pilot,
or demonstration basis" if he finds that such amendment or waiver
141d.
1Id.
16 For a sample of such comments, examine H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8,
121, 141, 142, 147 (1959) (THE FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY):
Through enlargement and orderly refinement of the body of fundamental
knowledge concerning highway accidents will come opportunities for deeper
insight, for formulation and testing of accident causes by hypothesis, and for
practical development of means for safer street and highway travel.
H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966);
S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6, 14, 15 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of
1966); Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 7, 8, 10, 50, 85, 104, 111, 131, 142, 222;
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 180, 205, 328, 332, 335.
1970
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would serve the "public interest. '' 7 The lack of descriptive content in
the subjective phrase "public interest" means the Secretary (NHSB)
may approve or disapprove experimental, pilot, and demonstration
programs without running afoul of the statute.
The Secretary (NHSB) is given yet another power, one involving
the expenditure of federal highway safety funds. To insure that local
(urban) highway safety programs would not suffer at the expense of
the state programs, the Congress provided that at least 40 percent of
all federal safety funds apportioned to a state for any fiscal year would
be expended by the political subdivisions of the state on such programs,
if the local program is approved by the governor of the state and if it
is in accord with the promulgated uniform standards." However, the
Secretary is given the power to waive the 40 percent requirement in
whole or in part for a fiscal year for any state.' 9 The only control on
this authority is the requirement that the Secretary determine that
"there is an insufficient number of local highway safety programs to
justify the expenditure" of 40 percent of federal funds locally during
that year.2" He decides how few local programs are an "insufficient
number," and he determines what is a justified expenditure of federal
funds.
B. Limitations on the Power of the Secretary of Transportation and the
National Highway Safety Bureau
Despite the broad power grants to the Secretary (NHSB), the
Congress did provide some effective limitations in its legislation. These
limitations take the form of threshold requirements which must be met
by the states. In evaluating state highway safety programs, there are
certain program requirements over which the Secretary (NHSB) has
no control and, hence, no power of choice. Specifically, a state highway
safety program must: (1) provide that the governor of the state is
responsible for its administration; (2) authorize political subdivisions
of the state to carry out local highway safety programs as part of the
state program, if they are approved by the governor and meet the
Secretary's uniform standards; (3) provide that at least 40 percent of
the federal funds received will be expended on local programs, subject
to waiver of this requirement by the Secretary; (4) provide that the
aggregate expenditure of state and local funds for such programs will
be maintained at a level equal to the average level of such expendi-
tures for the two fiscal years preceding enactment of the statute;
(5) provide for comprehensive driver training programs including
1723 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).





driver education in schools, training of qualified school instructors,
appropriate regulations of other driver training schools, adult driver
training programs and retraining programs for selected drivers, and
development of practice driving facilities, simulators, and similar teach-
ing aids.2 '
C. Sanctions Applicable to Noncomplying States
As one sanction applicable to noncomplying states after Decem-
ber 31, 1968, the statute provides that "the Secretary shall not apportion
any [safety] funds .. . to any State which is not implementing a
highway safety program approved by the Secretary in accordance with
this section." 22 Further, after January 1, 1969, states not "implementing"
an approved program will lose 10 percent of the federal-aid highway
funds they otherwise would have received, until such time as they are
implementing an approved program."3 The responsibility to determine
what constitutes "implementing" is in the Secretary (NHSB) .24 Fur-
thermore, whenever he determines it to be in the "public interest," the
Secretary may suspend - for such periods as he deems necessary - the
application of this 10 percent reduction of federal-aid highway funds.2"
Apparently, he has almost complete authority to waive this sanction,
for the vague term "public interest" does not limit his discretion and
there is no statutory control on the time period which he might deem
"necessary."
Such potentially powerful financial sanctions put the Secretary
and the NHSB in a persuasive position vis-a-vis recalcitrant states.
They have available "carrot and stick" techniques to secure compliance
with the uniform standards. However, the existence of this awesome
power to secure compliance by the withholding of funds does not
necessarily mean that it should or will, in fact, be used.26
II. THE FEDERAL-STATE POWER BALANCE
The authority of the NHSB to establish driver performance stan-
dards and grant exceptions, to approve or disapprove state programs,
and to impose financial sanctions on noncomplying states suggests the
NHSB program may result in a modification of the current power
balance between the state and federal governments in an area in which
lId. §§ 402(b)(1)-(2).
21d. § 402(c).
3 Id. Federal-aid highway funds are administered under authority of the provisions of 23
U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
2'This arises from the fact that the statute does not provide any suggestion as to how
"implementing" should be interpreted. The Secretary (NHSB) must, therefore, make
the determinations on whatever basis he deems appropriate.
25 23 U.S.C. § 402(c)(Supp. 1970).
0 Safety Hassle, The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1969, at 1, wherein Secretary Volpe
indicated he might withhold funds from recalcitrant states.
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power has been traditionally left to the states. This thought leads to
a consideration of both the legality and the extent of the federal
involvement in the field of highway safety.
A. Constitutionality
There is little doubt that the Congress possesses, on several
grounds, the authority to assert itself in the area of driver control.
The evolution of the Commerce Clause as a power base from Gibbons
v. Ogden27 through Champion v. Ames 8 to Darby Lumber Company,"'
Wickard v. Filburn,30 Heart of Atlanta Motel,3 and Katzenbach v.
McClung,32 need not be described in detail. The United States Supreme
Court's broad reading of the Commerce Clause - as demonstrated in
these cases - lays to rest any serious doubt that the Court would not
sustain highway safety legislation based on the commerce power. Fur-
thermore, the Court impliedly recognized latent power in Congress
in the highway safety area in the early case of Hendrick v. Maryland."3
It was held therein that the State of Maryland had the authority to
require a District of Columbia resident temporarily using its highways
to register his vehicle or secure permission to operate it as a non-resident.
In the course of its opinion, the Court suggested the existence of a
paramount but unexercised power of Congress to enter the field: "In
the absence of national legislation covering the subject a State may
rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and
order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles
- those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. ' 8 4 By this
language the Court implied not only power in Congress to legislate but
also power to pre-empt the area and supplant the regulations of the
various states with its own.35 However, unless the Congress acts
affirmatively, state regulation is permitted so long as its measures do
not unduly burden"6 or discriminate" against interstate traffic.
27 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28188 U.S. 321 (1903).
2United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
30317 U.S. 111 (1942).
31 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
32379 U.S. 294 (1964).
33 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
341d. at 622. The Court reaffirmed this position in Kane v. New Jersey, 252 U.S. 160,
167-68 (1916).
3 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524n.5 (1959); cf. Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See also Cooley v. Board, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
36 Id.
3 South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); cf. Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
524 (1959). See also Cooley v. Board, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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Congress may rely upon, in addition to the Commerce Clause, other
constitutionally granted powers to intervene in the field of highway
safety. For example, Congressional power to spend for the general
welfare has been approved by the United States Supreme Court in such
broad, unlimited terms as to allow comprehensive federal programs in
a multitude of areas of national concern. 8 The only limitation on this
power is that its use must relate to some national, as distinguished from
local, purpose or problem.! 9 Congress could also use the technique of
attaching conditions to federal grant-in-aid funds, so long as the condi-
tions bear a relation to a national purpose or problem;4° and the power
to "establish post offices and post roads, ' 41 might also be employed
by implication to support federal highway safety legislation.
In summary, it is reasonable to assume that any one or a combi-
nation of these formal Congressional power bases would indeed support
federal legislation injecting the national government into the highway
safety field.
B. Federal Pre-emption in Law
If the federal involvement of 1966 is assumed to be legitimate,
the next question is whether the legislation has, in fact, changed the
federal-state power balance in the field of highway safety. If some
change in the balance is presumed, the extent of the change should be
considered. The most extensive change would occur if the legislation
had the effect of pre-empting the field as was implied to be permissible
in Hendrick v. Maryland.42
1. General Pre-emption
Congressional hearings, committee reports, presidential statements,
and later testimony of officials indicate reservations on the part of
Congress to entirely supplant the states as policy makers in the field
of highway safety. There are several statements to the effect that the
3 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); see Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936); U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power: (1) To lay and collect taxes, duties.
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States ...." Id.
3 9 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936).
40Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). Despite an argument
that such legislation violated the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld with-
drawal of a portion of Oklahoma's share of federal highway funds for failing to remove
from office a member of the State Highway Commission who took an active part in
political activities. His actions constituted a violation of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 7324 (1967), which forbade political activities financed in whole or in part with
federal funds. Id. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting opinion).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 2 3 5 U.S. 610 (1915).
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federal government is to supply "leadership" in the field and "help" the
states develop adequate highway safety programs.48 While there are
also several expressions of demand for specific uniform standards in
specified areas of highway safety action policies, 44 these latter expres-
sions may signify only that Congress desired federal "leadership" '
to take the form of pre-emption in the designated areas, as opposed
to general pre-emption. Perhaps the words "cooperation" and "leader-
ship" were used to make some limited form of pre-emption more
palatable to the Congress and the states. In any event, whether "leader-
ship" means limited pre-emption or merely federal guidance, the
legislative history of the Act would not appear to support an argument
of general pre-emption of the safety field.
2. Interstitial Pre-emption
As indicated above, if there is pre-emption intent in the Act, it
might take a limited form which could appropriately be termed "inter-
stitial" pre-emption. That is, Congress may have desired to provide
leadership in highway safety generally - and thus have intended no
complete pre-emption - and, at the same time, it may have determined
that the working safety policy should be made at the federal level and
applied uniformly, where there are expressions of a desire for some-
thing more than "leadership"." The fact that the precise federal
policies would be made by an administrative agency (NHSB) instead
of the Congress is of no moment, for this has presented no difficulty
in cases involving pre-emption by the regulations of other administra-
tive agencies.47
Driver licensing is one of those facets of the highway safety prob-
4 Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 5, 6-7, 42, 131, 151.
4id. at 131; H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Highway Safety Act of
• 1966).
45 Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 5, 6-7, 42, 131, 151.
46 For instance, House Report No. 1700, refers to the Baldwin Amendment of 1965 (23
U.S.C. §135 (1965)) which provides that states "should" adopt highway safety pro-
grams in accord with uniform standards promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce.
The Report concludes that the Secretary got nowhere in conference with the states and
that "[t)here was no real progress." H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
At another point the Report refers to the fact that for forty years various safety
organizations "have been trying to persuade the several State legislatures to adopt at
least minimum uniform regulatory statutes, with lamentable lack of success." Id. at 6.
However, the Report does recognize what it calls a "paramount" role for the states since
states register automobiles, license drivers, educate the children, police traffic and enforce
statutes. Nevertheless, any desire to leave these traditional state functions in state hands
is not necessarily inconsistent with the pre-emption argument, for each of these functions
could continue to be performed and applied uniformly by all states according to stand-
ards adopted federally. The Report speaks of the insufficiency of most state programs
and concludes that a "mandatory program" (id. at 7) insisted upon by the Congress
may save more lives.
47 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). See also Florida Lime &




lem where there is reason to believe that Congress may have acted to
pre-empt interstitially. House Report No. 170048 addresses this area:
The wide variation from State to State, and the failure to achieve any
semblance of control or uniformity, bespeak pressures and adherence
to customs long out of date. Driver licensing is apparently more a
source of revenue than a safety control. A person licensed to drive in
one State, however, is in fact licensed to drive anywhere. State lines are
not barriers to drivers in our highly mobile society, nor would anyone
want them to be. But strict uniform licensing and renewal procedures
must be developed and adopted, covering minimum age limits, manda-
tory physical and eyesight examinations, competent skills tests and
written or oral examinations on traffic laws, varieties of traffic condi-
tions, and emergency situations that arise in the operation of an
automobile.49
Like the House Committee Report, the report5" accompanying the
Senate Bill provides: "The value of uniformity is clear in such matters
as standards for driver training and education and periodic re-exami-
nation of drivers. ""
If genuinely sought, the "strict uniformity" mentioned in the House
Report can come about only through uniform federal licensing stan-
dards. In our form of federalism, only a "senior partner" sovereign
(the federal government) possesses the necessary power ("leadership")
to force ("lead") "strict uniformity" of licensing upon state sovereign-
ties. If expressed in precise terms, such standards will have the effect
of pre-empting the states in the area of driver licensing.
3. Minimum Standards Pre-emption
Within either form of pre-emption - general or interstitial - an
alternate form exists by which the Secretary (NHSB) may take action.
Rather than establishing comprehensive uniform standards, the Secre-
tary (NHSB) may promulgate minimum standards to be applied
uniformly. To illustrate: It is plausible to read the federal legislation
as involving driver licensing pre-emption only to the extent requiring
minimum levels of uniformity. This approach would recognize con-
tinuing power in the states to adopt driver licensing standards higher
than the minimum requirements imposed by the NHSB. On the other
hand, state standards not meeting the federal minimum would be
supplanted by the federal standards.52
This form of pre-emption raises issues inherent in the higher-lower
standards dichotomy. That is, when federal action is characterized as
a requirement of minimum uniformity, a different licensing standard
4H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
49 Id. at 9.
50S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
slId. at 5.
52The distinction between the pre-emptive effect of minimum standards and uniform
federal standards is described in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963).
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established or proposed by a state may be viewed in one of two ways:
It may be considered to relate to the imposition of further controls to
prevent driver failure, or it may be viewed as necessary to protect indi-
vidual freedom of travel.5 8 Thus, what is "higher" in terms of safety
is also more restrictive, i.e., "lower," in terms of free travel. Likewise,
a control which is "lower" in terms of safety is less restrictive, i.e.,
"higher" in terms of protecting free travel.
It is important to recognize that, at some point, the goal of
increased highway safety must yield to demands for social efficiency.
Hence, Congress is probably not to be understood as justifying higher
standards of safety to the extent of completely disregarding the impact
of safety policies on the need to travel, with a driver's license serving
as a primary means of expressing that need.54 Such an interpretation
would permit the states to adopt any sort of repressive control measure
which could be shown to contribute to highway safety and to justify the
controls in terms of the National Highway Safety Act. Absolute safety
on the streets and highways cannot be expected; the corresponding loss
of efficiency in transportation would not be worth the social cost.
4. Determination of the Pre-emption Issue
Of course, the decision as to whether there is legal pre-emption
of the driver licensing field would be provided by the courts. This result
is apparent from the fact that a body of court-created doctrine has been
developed.55 Hence, the above comments are only speculative, for as
yet the courts have not confronted the question. However, there is
sufficient material available on which to base a plausible pre-emption
argument. No doubt such an argument could prove useful to the person
whose license is withdrawn under a state statute or regulation believed
to be inconsistent with uniform standards promulgated by the NHSB.
C. Federal Pre-emption in Fact
Whether there has been pre-emption in law by Congress in the area
of highway safety may be an academic question for the reason that
there may be pre-emption in fact. This follows from the political and
economic leverage over the states which is enjoyed by the federal gov-
53 The right to travel has been accorded Constitutional protection. E.g., Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1941); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); cf. Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); Williams
v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873);
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
54 The importance of the motor vehicle as a mode of expressing mobility in American
society is amply demonstrated in the APPENDIX infra.
55 See generally S. Doc. 39, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 282-94 (1964) (THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION).
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errment. The states may have no real choice other than to comply with
the federal mandates in the field of highway safety.
The key to the federal "leadership," "partnership," or "coopera-
tion" with the states - however labelled - is simply money! State
governments need federal grants-in-aid to accomplish the many social
programs which they pursue. What makes possible pre-emption in fact
is the legal doctrine which permits Congress, in the exercise of its
spending power, to fix the terms on which allotments of federal funds
will be made.5" The doctrine is such that a state which receives "offers
of seductive favors ' 57 from the federal government is expected to
submit to the terms on which the favors are offered or "adopt 'the
simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion.''58
However, given the shift of economic power to the federal govern-
ment through the income tax and other federal funding measures, is it
realistically possible for states to refuse federal grants-in-aid, despite
distasteful conditions which are imposed? The "simple expedient
' 59
of refusing to be coerced is a simplistic answer in a society which, in
fact, depends on economic adjustments to be made by the federal govern-
ment no matter what form they may take.
Hence, Congress, well aware of the limited or nonexistent choice
available to states, has created many federal spending programs to
which conditions are attached. Relevant to highway safety, the interstate
system of highways and the federal-aid systems are two examples of
such programs. While both of these projects are the combination of
many years of state-federal "cooperation" in this field, 0 the Federal
Highway Administration 61 promulgates the detailed specifications
which must be met by state programs, and it approves state project
proposals which are to be federally funded in part.6 2 These programs
have been successful in securing more highway mileage of higher quality
than would have been built if states had been forced to go it alone, and
the states have come to depend on such grants-in-aid.
The relevance of such programs to the highway safety program
lies in the power of the NHSB to refuse to approve a state safety pro-
gram. 63 With a broad base of transferred power- supported by the
authority to impose financial sanctions on recalcitrant states - and
5 See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
57 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 599 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting
opinion).
58 Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
59 Id. at 143.
60 23 U.S.C. §§ 103, 107, 111, 113, 115, 127 (1966).
61 Id. § 109.
6
2 Id. § 106.
63 Id. § 402 (a) (Supp. 1970): "Each State shall have a highway safety program ap-
proved by the Secretary . . " Id. See text accompanying notes 22-26 srupra.
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given the economic position of the states, it appears that the NHSB
can, indeed, provide the "leadership" necessary to inspire the states to
adopt highway safety programs in accord with its uniform standards.
In the final analysis there may be pre-emption of state power in fact,
if not in law. In either case the federal role in highway safety will
ultimately become dominant. This will follow if the NHSB makes
efficient use of its standard setting and sanctioning authority.
III. NHSB PHILOSOPHY REGARDING STANDARDS
As his explanation of the approach taken by NHSB to its initial
standards, former Federal Highway Administrator Lowell Bridwell
stated:
I should point out that a policy choice was involved in our adoption
of the new standards. If all States were to be required to meet every
portion of every provision of the standards by the end of next year,
[December 31, 19681 this course would have called for adopting
standards with a fairly low level of performance.
Alternatively, the standards could reach much higher levels if they
were to specify high but realistic goals to which the States could aspire
in their programs. For that reason, the policy was adopted of setting
goals as the only feasible method of procedure. The standards are
therefore phrased in broad terms, permitting some variation in State
regulations and allowing for a degree of flexibility between the States
in experimenting with different program approaches to produce more
effective results.
6 4
Dr. William Haddon, Jr., then Administrator of NHSB echoed
Mr. Bridwell as follows:
If the programs of all States were required to meet all aspects of
all standards by the end of 1968, this would necessitate standards ap-
proaching the lowest common denominator of present State and com-
munity programs. If, on the other hand, the standards were to set goals
which the States could work toward, they could be set at much higher
levels. This latter alternative was adopted as the only one which would
adequately satisfy the purposes of the Act. 65
At another point Dr. Haddon stated: "The standards, therefore specify
what is to be done, and not 'how' or by whom." '
A. The Relationship Between the Philosophy and the Act
Perhaps this NHSB approach to its standards development func-
tion is justifiable as to the overall program and, in general, as to the
thirteen initial standards,67 but it is doubtful that the NHSB can justify
its argument that the standards had to be expressed in "broad terms"
and at "realistic" levels. In part, the NHSB philosophy may be criti-
6Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 174-75.
65Id. at 178.
"Id. at 180.
87 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1970).
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cized for erroneously assuming that the National Highway Safety
Act required states to meet all NHSB standards before January 1, 1969.
It is true that Sec. 402 (b) of the Act forbids approval of any state
highway safety program which does not contain the five mandated
provisions;" however, there is no statutory requirement that the man-
dated provisions or other standards promulgated by NHSB must be
operational by that date. Conversely, the statute provides that states
which are implementing (i.e., progressing toward compliance) approved
programs on January 1, 1969, will not lose federal safety or highway-aid
funds."9 Therefore, it is fallacious to assume that NHSB cannot include
high performance level components in its standards. Implementation
of state safety program elements may occur over a period of time. This
implementation concept is consistent with statements of the Under-
secretary of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administrator.' 0
Further, there are at least three reasons why states would not be
forced to lose federal funds if the NHSB were to adopt exacting and
precise standards. First, the NHSB has discretion to approve late imple-
mentation of approved state programs, so long as some real progress
is made. Congress accepts this without question.7' Second, the Act gives
the Secretary of Transportation power to protect the state share of
highway funds (but not the safety funds), authorizing him "in the
public interest" to suspend the safety program approval requirement
of any state "for such period as he deems necessary." '72 Third, the Act
6823 U.S.C. § 402(b) (Supp. 1970).
BaId. § 402(c).
70 The NHSB policies emphasize implementation of state safety programs over a period
of time. The NHSB believes it has power to approve state program plans on December
31, 1968, but allow for full implementation later as the state progresses in fulfilling its
obligations under the plan approved. For example, Under Secretary of Transportation
Everett Hutchinson stated to the National Highway Safety Advisory Committee:
The law provides that each Governor shall submit to the Secretary of Trans-
portation, for his approval, a comprehensive highway safety program by De-
cember 31, 1968. Each program will be reviewed in the light of the progress
the plan calls for over the existing level of safety program performance in the
State. A plan does not have to provide for full implementation of the standards
the Secretary will promulgate by any specific point in time.
In the final analysis, I cannot image [sic] a State being penalized 10 per
cent of its highway funds except in a very extreme situation. Of course, the
public interest will be served by early implementation of the safety programs.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 176-77 (quoted as part of the statement of Lowell
K. Bridwell, Federal Highway Administrator). See the statement of Dr. William
Haddon, former Director of NHSB, in the Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 177-79,
and the response of Mr. Bridwell to a question by Senator Cooper:
As I understand, it is absolutely correct that what you have to do is gauge the
progress that is being made and make a determination as to whether or not a
State is making not only a good faith effort, but also a substantial effort to
implement the regulations. Is that correct?
MR. BRIDWELL. Yes, sir; I think that certainly agrees with my assess-
ment.
Id. at 179. See also Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 206-07 (statement of Lowell
K. Bridwell).
71 Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, indicate this acceptance.
72 23 U.S.C. § 402(c) (Supp. 1970).
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gives the Secretary of Transportation power (in the "public interest")
to "amend or waive standards on a temporary basis for the purpose of
evaluating new or different highway safety programs instituted on an
experimental, pilot, or demonstration basis, by one or more States...."
This congeries of express power is ample authority upon which the
NHSB might justify individual state deviations from the exacting
standards which it could promulgate. In short, the NHSB was not
forced into the philosophy it chose to adopt.
B. Factors Contributing to the Philosophy
The philosophy adopted by the NHSB for determining the initial
standards may have been influenced in part by the probable federal
funding drain occurring as a result of demands imposed by the Viet
Nam war. Without sufficient federal grant-in-aid funds, high quality
state safety programs could not be implemented. However, this factor
does not justify the setting of low federal standards. The NHSB could
construe "implementing" to mean whatever progress is possible within
the budgetary limitations imposed.
Another factor which could have contributed to the perspective of
the standards chosen is the statutory requirement that the standards
must be developed in cooperation with the states, their political sub-
divisions, and appropriate federal agencies.14 The cooperative relation-
ships described in the Act may have been taken too literally, and the
desire for federal "leadership", which was expressed in the committee
reports of both Houses of Congress, may have been lost. In effect, the
philosophical rationale announced may have evolved during the NHSB
deliberations with states, political subdivisions, and other federal agen-
cies as to the standards which could "cooperatively" be agreed upon.
The determination to set "realistic goals' '7 also may have been
influenced by a desire to reassure the states that most of them would
be able to meet NHSB expectations without resort to the waiver process.
Innocuous standards may be promulgated to demonstrate that the
NHSB is fulfilling its responsibilities. Unfortunately, such standards
may be erroneously assumed by the general public to make a significant
contribution to improved driver performance. Political considerations
may get in the way of crusading spirit; and thus watered down, the
crusade enters a new phase in which the social problem, which led to
the creation of the agency, may become relegated to a secondary position.
The danger is that the mix of decision factors may become such that the
agency concerns itself with deciding standards' questions primarily on
the basis of what is expedient rather than what is needed.
73 id. § 402(a).
74Id. § 402(e).




IV. NHSB DRIVER LICENSING STANDARD
Inasmuch as the standards are based on the philosophy described
above, they should be analyzed to determine the effect of the imple-
mentation in light of the stated philosophy. For purposes of this paper,
the NHSB driver licensing standard will serve as an example of the
effect of the philosophy on a single aspect of the federal program. It is
submitted that the philosophy, in this instance, has subverted the Con-
gressional desire for "uniform standards." However, it should be borne
in mind that driver licensing is only one of thirteen standards promul-
gated by NHSB. For this reason, the general success or failure of the
NHSB standards to achieve the goals set by Congress should not be
expected to be forecast from the analysis which follows.
A. General Provisions
Under the Act, the NHSB could have promulgated the mandatory
driver education and training standard"6 as the sole federal requirement
- 23 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(E) (Supp. 1970) wherein the Congress declared that no state
highway safety program should be approved by the Secretary of Transportation, unless
it provides for comprehensive driver education and training programs.
NHSB may be justified in expressing this standard in broad terms, for the reason
that driver education and driver training are two of the most expensive elements in any
highway safety program. The question of "where do we get the money?" looms large in
the minds of both state and federal officials. The Viet Nam War has resulted in a
drastic curtailment of federal safety funds available to NHSB. Furthermore, Congress
did not make successful completion of either a driver education or driver training course
a prerequisite to being licensed to drive. Hence, this standard relates to driver licensing
in the larger sense, in that it is also designed to improve driver performance, but it is
not imposed on individuals as a licensing control measure.
For these reasons, it is difficult to fault the NHSB driver education and training
standard. The congressional mandate has been met, for the standard does require estab-
lishment of such programs, and it contains all of the elements which appear in the
statute, with possibly one exception. The standard is vague on the point that the driver
education program must be within the state school systems and administered by appro-
priate school officials. Perhaps it is present by implication, but this statutory require-
ment could well be stated more explicitly.
The standard indicates that the content of the high school driver education course
will be expected to consist, at a minimum, of practice driving and instruction in the
following:
1. Basic and advanced driving techniques, including handling emergencies;
2. Rules of the road and other state and local laws and ordinances;
3. Critical vehicle systems and subsystems which require preventative maintenance;
4. Vehicle, highway, and community features which aid the driver in avoiding
crashes, protect him and his passengers in crashes, and maximize salvage of the
injured;
5. Signs, signals, highway markings, and design features of highways which must
be understood if one is to drive safely;
6. Differences between urban and rural driving, including use of expressways;
7. Pedestrian safety.
Highway Safety Program Standard No. 4, Driver Education, 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1970).
Finally, students are to be encouraged to enroll in first aid training. Id.
Other than providing for the high school course, states are further expected to:
(a) establish a research and development program leading to procurement of practice
driving facilities, simulators, and other teaching aids; (b) establish a program for adult
driver training and retraining; (c) establish a policy for control of commercial driving
schools by licensing them and certifying their instructors; and (d) evaluate its entire
program periodically, and provide NHSB with an evaluation summary. Id.
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in the area of driver controls for state programs. However, it exercised
its discretion to promulgate an additional standard pertaining to driver
licensing.7 7 This standard establishes "minimum" state licensing pro-
gram content; hence, states must adopt at least these licensing control
measures, but they are also obligated to structure their licensing pro-
grams to prevent needlessly removing the opportunity of the citizen to
drive.78 The eight components which comprise the standard will be
discussed consecutively along with relevant portions of the NHSB
Highway Safety Program Manual,79 which provides more specific
recommendations for implementing the standard.
B. Component I: One-License Concept
The state must adopt the one-license concept and identify the types
of vehicles the licensee is authorized to drive. 0 With a multiplicity of
licenses, the driver is in a position to continue driving until his supply
is "exhausted" by suspension, revocation, or expiration of all his licenses.
Multiple licensing makes it difficult to construct viable controls through
point system pressures and formal license actions by administrators or
courts. Thus, the one-license system makes it illegal to possess more
than one license and requires surrender of all valid licenses when apply-
ing for a license.8 If all states apply this concept, eventually all drivers
will be limited to a single license.
This requirement appears to be a worthwhile standard which is
within the power granted NHSB. It is useful, because it helps prevent
drivers from escaping licensing controls. It is relevant to improved
- Highway Safety Program Standard No. 5, Driver Licensing, 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Standard No. 5).
78 Id.
7 9 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAM MANUAL, VOL. 5,
DRIVER LICENSING (1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
The NHSB Manual is a publication proposed for the states to give them more specific
recommendations for implementing the Standards:
To assist the States in developing the details of their highway safety programs
under the new standards, the Bureau is now preparing a set of policies and
procedures to be issued with regard to each individual standard . . . . These
policies and procedures will provide specific recommendations for matters to
be incorporated in State and local program regulations. When State safety
projects are presented to the Department for approval, consideration will be
given to the extent to which the State has followed the recommendations em-
bodied in these policies and procedures.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 174 (statement of Lowell K. Bridwell, Federal
Highway Administrator).
To assist them [states] in the administration of their program, we have in-
cluded several projects, one of which will develop guidelines in the form of
texts and manuals, describing managerial policies, techniques, methods, and
procedures for conducting the safety programs.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 201 (statement of Dr. William Haddon, former
Director of the NHSB).
80 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(I).
81NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM
VEHICLE CODE § 6-101 (c) (Revised 1968).
VOL. 47
HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT
driver performance, for it helps make effective license withdrawal
decisions. The single-license concept may be evaluated as to its success
or failure as a safety measure by a determination of whether it permits
more effective control over individual drivers and makes it possible to
subject them to measures designed to improve driver performance.
However, evaluation must await the accumulation of sufficient experi-
ence data. It is not the sort of "broad generalized recommendation"
the House Committee rejected as unacceptable."'
C. Component II: Proof of Date and Place of Birth
Drivers must submit acceptable proof of date and place of birth
when applying for an original license.88 This component complements
the policy of establishing minimum age limits, which is based upon the
assumption that there is, in fact, a predictive relationship between age
and being involved in an accident. Furthermore, information with
respect to age makes it possible to collect accident statistics and relate
them to age. Hence, the proof requirement contributes to an evaluation
of the success or failure of age requirements as driver control measures.
It is acceptable as something more than a "broad generalized recom-
mendation."
8
D. Component III: Examinations
1. Initial Examination
All drivers must pass an initial examination in which the applicant
demonstrates his (1) "[albility to operate" the types of vehicles for
which he seeks a license; (2) "[a]bility to read and comprehend"
traffic signs and symbols; (3) "[kjnowledge of laws relating to" traffic,
safe driving practices, vehicle and highway safety features, emergency
situations, and other driving responsibilities; and (4) "[vlisual acuity,
which must meet or exceed State standards.
' 85
There is little doubt that all four parts of this component are
relevant to the goal of improved driver performance. Current knowl-
edge is not complete and empirical, but it is sufficient to justify assuming
a relationship exists.8"
2 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
8 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(11).
8
4H.R. REp. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
8 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, §§ 204.4(111) (A) (1-4).
86 Dr. Haddon, former NHSB administrator stated:
I think also that if we were to wait for adequate information with respect to
all of the more clearly important aspects of highway safety we, in effect, would
be doing nothing for a good many decades.
The issues are just so complicated that obviously we can, and I believe
should, move ahead for quite a few years on the best information that we have
available without waiting for the momentum of perfect information.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note I, at 205.
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But are these expressions acceptable as the sort of "performance
criteria"8' 7 standards which Congress expected from the NHSB? Are
they capable of being evaluated as to their success or failure "in actual
application" ?"8 Are they anything more than "broad generalized recom-
mendations" ?89 If they are neither of these, then in what sense are they
"uniform" ?90 Are they actually "nonuniform nonstandards" and outside
the meaning of the Act?
Phrases such as "[a]bility to operate,' 1 "[a]bility to read and
comprehend," 92 "[k]nowledge of law,""3 and "[v]isual acuity"'94 are
sufficiently amorphous to require further definition if they are to be
applied by the states. By making it necessary for the states to give their
own content to these phrases, the so-called "standard" is revealed to be
devoid of content. Furthermore, the "strict uniform' 95 licensing pro-
grams sought by the House Report on the Act are likely to be lost
because states may individually ascribe whatever meaning they desire
to the phrases. For example, State A may require an extensive, in-depth
demonstration of ability to operate, while State B may require no more
than a superficial demonstration. Yet, both states may contend, with
justification, that they have met this part of the federal standard!
State A may require visual acuity of 20/40 correctable in both eyes,
while State B may require only 20/40 correctable in one eye. Yet, both
states may contend that they are in compliance with the visual acuity
requirement.
Where is the uniformity which Congress sought? Is not each state
left to write its own standards as has been the practice? About the most
that can be said for this component of the standard is that it informs
the states that they are supposed to "do something" in the areas identi-
fied without telling them what is really expected.
In order to "do something" which would result in NHSB approval
of the state program when reviewed after December 31, 1968, the state
had few ways in which to discover what was actually expected of it.
Aside from conferences with NHSB personnel, the only other source
of information appears to be the NHSB Highway Safety Program
Manual, Vol. 5, Driver Licensing (1969).6 It provides little specific
V 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
8 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
89 Id.
90 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
91 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(111) (A) (1).
9
2 1d. § 204.4(111) (A) (2).
9 3 1d. § 204.4(III) (A) (3).
94 1d. § 204.4(111) (A) (4).
9 5 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
96 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 6-7.
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guidance for state administrators as to the meaning of the vague
language of this component of the driver licensing standard.
For example, the required demonstration of "ability to operate
' 9 7
is explained to mean that a road performance test should be given and
should include- but not limited to- the road test recommendations
of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators in Test-
ing Drivers.98 In addition, the examiner is expected to explain any un-
satisfactory performance to the applicant, and the road performance
test may be omitted if a licensee with a satisfactory driving record is
applying for renewal or if the applicant possesses a license from another
state having an acceptable licensing program.99 The specific licensing
policies' 00 which the states are expected to adopt are not articulated
in the Manual.
The required demonstration of ability to read and comprehend
traffic signs and symbols is also not explained further in the Manual.10'
Similarly, the required demonstration of knowledge of laws relating to
traffic, safe driving practices, vehicle, highway and other safety features
is amplified only briefly. 10 2 The specific elements of the knowledge test
are not indicated and must be created by each state.
The required test of visual acuity is amplified in the Manual to
include an evaluation of field of vision.'03 This raises a related question:
If the NHSB believes license applicants should be examined for field
of vision, why is it not included in its standard? The Manual implies
visual acuity is only one of several vision factors which relate to
improved driver performance. Perhaps the explanation is found, in
part, in the NHSB administrative philosophy to establish "watered-
down" standards with which states could more easily comply.'0 4
2. Licensee Re-examination
After an initial examination, each licensee must be re-examined
every four years for "at least visual acuity and knowledge of rules of
the road."' 0 5 This component presses the states to recognize that con-
tinuing driver controls are necessary, since it is fallacious to assume
97 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4 (III) (A) (1).
98 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 6.
9 Id. ch. IV, at 6-7.
10 I.e., the actual criteria of decision applied as working policies in the state licensing
program.
101 MANUAL, supra note 79. ch. IV, at 5.
'
0 2 Id. ch. IV, at 5, 6.
103 Id. ch. IV, at 5. These visual characteristics, along with depth perception, muscle bal-
ance, and color perception, are believed, by the American Optometric Association and
the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, to be relevant to proper
performance of the driving task. AMERICAN OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, VISION SCREEN-
ING FOR DRIVER LICENSING 12-13 (1966).
10 4 See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
105 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(111) (B).
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that physical and mental characteristics of drivers do not change after
initial licensing. Periodic re-examination facilitates discovery of licensees
who no longer qualify. This requirement should also help eliminate
the license renewal by mail practice - followed in some states - which
destroys the utility of the license renewal process as a safety device,
at least insofar as the renewal function is expected to involve a re-
evaluation of the licensee. Thus, periodic re-examinations are relevant
to improved driver performance. Furthermore, the re-examination
requirement will be capable of being so evaluated as to its success or
failure in actual application, after sufficient experience to permit accu-
mulation of a base of data.
Unfortunately, however, this component uses the same type of
vague phrases which appear in the previous component and is thus
subject to the criticism that it, too, is devoid of content. The states are
told they must re-examine licensees on at least two of the factors tested
for initial licensing; but they are not told what is expected because the
standard is so vague as to be meaningless. The NHSB driver licensing
Manual indicates the re-examination should occur prior to license
renewal at least every four years and should include as a minimum
"the tests for visual ability and knowledge of rules and regulation.
10 6
The road test may be waived at renewal if the applicant's driving record
is satisfactory.
107
E. Component IV: Driver Record System
This component imposes on states recordkeeping responsibilities,
which should lead to a future source of detailed information on indi-
vidual drivers. It requires the state record system to provide rapid entry
of data, controls to eliminate delay in obtaining data for the system,
rapid response to requests for status of license validity, ready avail-
ability of data for statistical purposes, and ready identification of
drivers.108 The Manual suggests that close liaison should be maintained
with state education, highway, health, welfare, and traffic records
agencies in order to facilitate an interchange of information. "09
Such a requirement is useful, because it facilitates collection of
information for both highway safety research purposes and for the
driver identification and license validity purposes. The building of a
base of appropriate licensee information obviously has relevance to
improved driver performance, if only because it makes possible more
sophisticated research on driver behavior.
106 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 4, 8.
107Id. ch. IV, at 6, 7.
108 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, §§ 204.4(IV) (A)-(E).
109 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 11.
VOL. 47
HIGHWI-4Y SAFETY ACT
F. Component V: Specific Term and Renewal of Licenses
This portion of the federal licensing standard requires states to
issue licenses for "a specific term,"" 0 and they must be "renewed"''
to remain valid. At the time of both issuance and renewal, the appli-
cant's "record must be checked.""'
Yet the NHSB's meaning of "specific term""-' is not clear. Does
it mean any period of time adopted by the state which has an identi-
fiable beginning and end? If NHSB desires the term to be no longer
than the four-year maximum term established for re-examination in
Component III, why doesn't it so specify? Such vague language in the
standard presents the states with the same problem described above
with respect to the initial examination requirements.
However, if state officials examine the licensing Manual, they will
discover that NHSB expects the maximum "specific term" of a license
to be no longer than four years." 4 Why is this information not included
in the language of the formal standard? Why is it tucked away in a
publication designed to interpret standards purportedly expressed as
"performance criteria" ?'" If NHSB knows this is what it will expect
of the states, why does it not so state in a straightforward manner?
Without the Manual, the states would be left to their own interpre-
tations of the phrase.
The component imposes the further requirement that a "driver's
record must be checked''16 at the time of issuance or renewal of the
license. For what is the record to be "checked"? The Manual merely
repeats the language of the standard.1 7 However, it does provide that
before issuing an original license, each state should request the National
Driver Register to "verify the applicant's eligibility for licensing."" 8
These appear to be the only statements which refer to checking the
applicant's "record." Furthermore, even if it were possible to ascertain
what is expected as a "check," what is the state supposed to do about
the matters which it checks? Under the present standard, a state may
"check" for many things and still determine that it is appropriate to
issue or renew a license. If the NHSB expects states to deny initial and




114 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 8.
115 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
116 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(V).
117 MANUAL, Supra note 79, ch. IV, at 9.
118 Id. ch. IV, at 7. The Register is fully described in THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY
BUREAU, THE NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTRa (1967). The Register acts as a clearing
house for driver identification and records information received from states.
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renewal licenses on the basis of certain factors to be checked, why
doesn't it so state?
In large measure, this entire component leaves the states to their
own devices to determine what NHSB expects of them. Yet safety
program approval by NHSB is required if states are to continue to
qualify for federal safety and highway-aid funds.
G. Component VI: Driver Improvement Program
Each state is required to establish a driver improvement program
"to identify problem drivers for record review and other appropriate
actions designed to reduce the frequency of their involvement in traffic
accidents or violations."" 9 The vagueness of this standard raises a
number of questions: What criteria are to be used to select those
licensees who are to be termed "problem drivers"? What sorts of
license actions are deemed "appropriate" and in what circumstances?
What assumptions lie behind the notion that frequency of "involve-
ment" in accidents should be reduced? Does this expression indicate
that NHSB assumes "involvement" in an accident to be the equivalent
of causation (i.e., fault) based on human failure ?12o Like the language
of other components, states may interpret the language of this standard
very differently and still be within its terms. As a result, there is no
assurance of uniformity among the states; it is another example of a
"nonuniform nonstandard." Again the states must consult the Manual
to determine what NHSB expects of them; and, fortunately, the
Manual describes more precisely the content of the driver improvement
program it expects states to establish. 12 '
Basically, the state licensing agency is expected to establish a
system of identification and rehabilitation of drivers who "repeatedly"
become involved in accidents and traffic law convictions.' 22 The selec-
tion of persons for treatment is to be made on the basis of a point
system such as that described in the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators publication, Guide to Driver Improvement.12 3
The essence of a point system is the assignment of a numerical value
to traffic law convictions and accidents according to their "severity."' 24
When the total number of points reaches a predetermined action level,
119 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(VI).
120 For a full discussion of this question, see J. REESE, POWER, POLICY, PEOPLE: A STUDY
OF DRIVER LICENSING ADMINISTRATION Pt. II, ch. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as J.
REESE).
121 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 12-15.
12 Id. ch. IV, at 12.
123 Id.; NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM
VEHICLE CODE § 206(b), wherein there is included a point system for the identification
of problem drivers.
124 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 12. What is meant by "severity"?
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the administrative machinery is activated, and some "reform' 25 action
designed to improve driving performance is taken.
The action is initiated by specially trained driver analysts who are
expected to review the record of each driver.126 According to the
Manual, the first action should consist of sending an advisory letter
to drivers who have accumulated a certain number of points but who
are not yet considered to have become serious problem drivers.' 27 The
second action should consist of a personal interview - to be conducted
by a driver analyst - after an advisory letter has been sent followed
by the accumulation of more points. The interview is expected to
"[rJesult in recommendations by the driver analyst of remedial measures
designed to improve the driving performance . "... 1128
The range of remedial choices available to the analyst for recom-
mendation includes (but is not limited to) the following:
(a) Referral to a Medical Advisory Board - This recommenda-
tion is justified when the analyst has "reason to believe" that the
licensee has a physical or mental limitation which impairs his driving
performance.1 9 However, the Manual does not provide the factors
which the analyst should use to conclude that there is "reason to
believe" medical evaluation is necessary. The Manual suggests that
states should establish their own guidelines to assist the analyst to select
the most suitable measures. 130 The results of any medical examination
are to be reviewed by the Medical Advisory Board before further action
is taken. 3 ' However, the medical criteria and standards to be applied
by the Board are not stated. Perhaps the primary reason statements
regarding mental and physical limitations on driving are not more
precise is that not enough is known about the driving task to permit
its elements to be identified and quantified. 1 2 Until this has been
accomplished, there will be a great deal of calculated guessing by
analysts and medical boards.
(b) Instruction- The analyst may decide driving performance
can be sufficiently upgraded by discussing with the licensee "the specific
problem areas"' 33 believed to have caused poor performance. How the
analyst determines the problem areas or when such a decision is
appropriate remains unstated, and no examples are given.
'25Id. ch. IV, at 12.
128Id. ch. IV, at 12-13.
127 Id. ch. IV, at 13. How is the "serious" problem driver to be identified? The point system
per se does not make the selection. Someone must establish an action level, and the
action level may vary widely from state to state. The uniformity Congress sought is
sacrificed.




132J. REESE, supra note 120, pt. II, ch. 1.
13 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 14.
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(c) Driver improvement school - The analyst is expected to
require attendance at such a school when he "has concluded that such
treatment may improve the licensee's driving performance."'3 4 Yet
upon what factors is the analyst to base such a conclusion? There are
no illustrations. The Manual is as useless as the standard! To permit
analysts to make this judgment on factors known only to themselves
makes it impossible to evaluate and control analysts' choices within the
range of recommendations. If this situation occurs, it is virtually impos-
sible to determine whether the agency has provided the due process
and equal protection of the law's guarantees which the general public
is entitled to expect of its administrative agencies. The factors of choice
should be made known.
(d) The final three remedial choices available to the analyst are
license probation, license suspension, and license revocation."3 5 Suspen-
sion is expected to be recommended when the analyst concludes that
it "[w]ill produce an improvement in an individual's driving habits
.... "186 How the analyst is to decide and what factors he is to use
in estimating the probability of improvement of habits are not stated.
Such vagueness vests in the analyst a broad case of uncontrolled
authority to make the critical initial withdrawal decision which, in all
probability, will become that of the agency. Without knowledge of the
specific criteria of decision, it will be difficult to evaluate and control
the analysts' recommendations.
The Manual suggests probation in lieu of suspension when deemed
appropriate.' 37 Yet the factors which should be used to decide when
probation is appropriate are not indicated in the Manual.
Revocation is said to be appropriate when the analyst concludes
that the attained driving record "precludes the immediate upgrading
of the individual's driving ability' '1 3 8 through any of the other choices.
Again, the Manual is of no assistance, for it does not indicate the
criteria on which the recommendation should be based.
A final driver improvement program suggestion found in the
Manual is that all licensees suspended "may"' 39 be re-examined in the
same manner as are original license applicants before their licenses are
restored. Further, the Manual provides that an examination must be





137id. ch. IV, at 7.
3
8 
1d. ch. IV, at 14.
13 Id. ch. IV, at 4. The use of the word "may" is an invitation to states to delay instituting
a policy requiring re-examination of licensees following expiration of a period of sus-
pension. "May" transfers power to the states to choose not to re-examine.
140 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 4.
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The existence of the Manual suggests several questions about the
formal language of the licensing standard. First, if the NHSB expects
its Manual recommendations to be part of the state programs, why does
it not state them in the standards? If it can reduce them to writing in the
Manual, it can include them in the language of the standard. It must not
be forgotten that NHSB has power to approve state safety program
plans which have not yet been fully implemented. 14 1 Therefore, a
standard containing specific requirements would constitute a useful
policy statement to which backward states could aspire.
Second, several instances have been described wherein the Manual
is either silent on the particular topic or speaks in the same terms as
the standard. The Manual, therefore, does not provide the specific
recommendations which Mr. Bridwell and Dr. Haddon promised.
14 2
Third, the net effect of parroting the language of the formal
standard in the Manual is to leave the NHSB with almost total discre-
tion to approve or disapprove the driver licensing provisions of state
safety programs on whatever basis it desires. The NHSB has not com-
mitted itself except in general terms, for it has promulgated a "non-
standard" which is inadequately explained in its Manual. This is
particularly true of the initial licensing examination component, the
renewal process component, and the driver improvement program
component.
H. Component VII: Medical Evaluations
1. Establishment of a System
States must establish a system which provides for "medical evalu-
ation" of licensees whom the agency "has reason to believe have mental
or physical conditions which might impair their driving ability."' 48
The NHSB licensing Manual contains two elements pertaining to
medical evaluation of specific licensees: The first is the authority of the
driver analyst to refer licensees to a medical advisory board, licensed
physicians, or specialists for examination as part of the driver improve-
ment program, 144 and the second is a requirement that the results of a
physical examination should be reviewed by the medical advisory
board before any license action is taken by the agency.' 45
A curious feature of both the standard and the Manual is that they
appear to assume medically trained persons possess competence not only
to evaluate physical conditions but also to determine to what extent
those conditions relate to performance of the driving task. It is sub-
141 23 U.S.C. 402(c) (Supp. 1970); see notes 69-71 supra.
142 See note 79 supra.
143 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(VII) (A).




mitted that, at best, the conclusions of the physician relative to appro-
priate licensing action will be largely guesswork. This contention is
based primarily on the fact that high quality research into the nature
of the driving task has been unable to describe the task in terms which
permit its quantification.' 46 Until this has been done, the actual relation-
ships of mental and physical abilities to the driving task remain in large
measure speculative.
No doubt it is useful to acquire medical opinion before licensing
action based on physical and mental qualities is taken. No doubt such
decisions will be made despite the lack of knowledge on the critical
issue of relevance to the driving task. However, medical opinion should
be recognized as offering no panacea to driver licensing administrators.
Although it is an informed judgment, the licensing recommendation of
a physician is nothing more than an opinion. It should be recognized
and treated as such. As more information on the nature of the driving
task becomes available and relevant characteristics are identified, the
licensing agencies, including NHSB, should make certain that medical
examiners base evaluations on those physical and mental factors known
to relate to the driving task. In short, the criteria of medical judgment
must be readily adaptable to change with the base of knowledge
acquired if medical judgment is to be rational. Furthermore, it would
seem that some knowledge of the driving function currently exists
although it is far from perfect. 147 Assuming this to be true, NHSB
should identify the physical and mental factors believed to be relevant
to driving and instruct the medical examiner to base his conclusions on
those factors insofar as it is possible. Criteria of judgment should be
indicated to the medical examiner no matter how imperfect. Surely
some such identification of criteria can be made, and hopefully, the
medical profession will insist upon it. Otherwise, the medical examiner's
responsibility to both the licensee and the traveling public may not be
met.
These comments also apply to the medical advisory board which
reviews the medical examiner's recommendations. 4 Although it is
composed of medically trained persons, there is no reason to assume
the board is more competent to determine the relevance of physical and
mental factors to the driving task. Similarly, medical advisory boards,
whose members may be unfamiliar with driver behavior research, should
be provided with guidance by those who make an occupational specialty
of high caliber highway safety research. It is they, if anyone, who should
148 According to Dr. Ross McFarland, and other researchers, our knowledge of the driving
task is fragmentary. See their statements to this effect, in J. REESE, supra note 120, pt. II,
ch. 1.
147 Highway Research Board Pilot Workshop on Human Factors in the Design and Opera-
tion of the Highway Transportation System (1968, proceedings not published). See
generally A. LITTLE, INC., THE STATE OF THE ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY (1966).
14
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MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 13.
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be familiar with the current state of scientific knowledge of the charac-
teristics of driver performance. If the medical advisory board is not
given such guidance in its review task, its decision may actually be
irrational, because it may be based on factors irrelevant to driving
performance; at the very least, it may be heavily colored by irrelevant
factors, erroneously thought to be relevant because of the "folklore"
and dogma of traditional safety literature which is typically based on
unreliable research conclusions.
149
2. Identity of Applicants for Aid to the Blind
States are expected to establish a procedure which will inform the
licensing agency of the identity of licensees who have applied for or are
receiving any type of aid to the blind or the near blind.' 50 This require-
ment establishes a form of licensee surveillance which, on its surface,
should aid in enforcing vision requirements for drivers. So viewed, it is
a commendable requirement. However, its effect in application may be
to drive into "hiding" licensees with serious vision deficiencies who
must choose between the receipt of state aid and the risk of losing their
licenses. It has been asserted that statutes making denial of the license
mandatory where epilepsy is involved have had that effect in some
states. 5 ' With respect to this requirement, the NHSB Manual makes
no specific recommendations; it merely restates the requirement in the
language of the standard.
3. The Medical Advisory Board
The states are expected to create a medical advisory board, or its
equivalent, "to advise the driver license agency on medical criteria and
vision standards.' 5 2 Such a requirement is comforting, for it suggests
that some licensing decisions should be made on medical criteria known
to be related to driver performance. It is also psychologically comforting
to be told such criteria ought to be established by "qualified person-
nel,"' 53 even though no statement of qualifications for appointment to
the Board is made. Considered together, these suggestions offer further
comfort, for they imply licensing decisions should not be made on
factors irrelevant to driving performance, e.g., morality, character, eco-
nomic status, or race. Therefore, such statements have the salutary
effect of reiterating the goal of driver licensing to be improved driver
performance and not the general regulation of antisocial conduct.
1"That such unreliable research exists is apparent from the comments of Dr. Ross Mc-
Farland, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
DRIVER SAFETY AND DRIVER LICENSING 44 (1964); W. HADDON, E. SUCHMAN, D.
KLEIN, ACCIDENT RESEARCH: METHODS AND APPROACHES 30 (1964).
15 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4 (VII) (B).
151 Fabing & Barrow, Restricted Drivers' Licenses to Controlled Epileptics: A Realistic
Approach to a Problem of Highwa) Safety, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 500 (1955).
152 Standard No. 5, supra note 77.
15 Id. § 204.4(VII) (c).
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However, the requirement is disquieting in other respects. What
basis exists for NHSB to presume that people who are "qualified"
(medically or otherwise) for appointment to such a Board are, in fact,
sufficiently acquainted with the current state of empirical research
knowledge to be competent to advise licensing agencies on "medical
criteria" and "visual standards" for driver license actions? A doctor
may be a good medical man and still know nothing about medical
factors or vision requirements in the context of driver performance.
Is this possibility recognized by NHSB? Are the Board members
instructed to study research findings and recommended norms of pro-
fessional groups in the licensing context (e.g., AAMVA-AOA vision
norms'. 4) in order to make medical and vision licensing criteria recom-
mendations? Why cannot significant research findings be compiled by
NHSB, or by one of its research contractors, be used as the basis of
medical and vision criteria and be written into NHSB standards? Per-
haps this kind of work is being done;.. but meanwhile, there is some
danger that local medical boards may suggest the use of irrelevant
medical factors as criteria for license actions.
Another difficulty with this federal standard in its current form
is that it presents the possibility of losing the desired uniformity of
licensing standards throughout the nation. As in other instances, the
language of the federal standard is imprecise. The quoted phrases are
so broad as to be meaningless. Similarly, the licensing Manual is not
helpful; it offers no more specific recommendations or definitions than
the formal language of the standard. 5 ' Hence, further definition will
be provided by the boards themselves, and there is no assurance they
will establish the same interpretations in all the states. Hence, what
begins as a vague expression in a so-called "uniform standard" promul-
gated by NHSB may actually result in fifty different sets of "medical
criteria" and "vision standards." If that occurs, the only assured uniform-
ity is that there will be boards and they will have made recommenda-
tions. This sort of uniformity can hardly be termed that which is
expected by Congress, for the concept of uniform performance criteria
is effectively destroyed. Another "nonuniform nonstandard" has been
promulgated by NHSB.
J. Component VIII: Periodic Evaluation of a State Licensing Program
The final component of the licensing standard is a requirement
that the state program shall be "periodically" evaluated by the state
1
5
4AMERICAN ASS'N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS & COMM. ON MOTORISTS'
VISION AND HIGHWAY SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN OPTOMETRIC ASS'N, VISION SCREEN-
ING FOR DRIVER LICENSING (1966).
165 The Institute for Educational Development, Newport Beach, California and Spindletop
Research, Lexington, Kentucky have been awarded NHSB research contracts to evaluate
driver licensing programs and inventory and evaluate licensing criteria.
166 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 19.
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and that a summary of the evaluation shall be given to the NHSB.
The evaluation is expected to attempt to ascertain the extent to which
driving without a license occurs; yet the standard does not make clear
to what extent and by what methodology the NHSB expects the states
to conduct such an evaluation, nor does it indicate what span of time
is meant by "periodically." Similarly, the licensing Manual does not
suggest a specific time span; and, while a sample checklist of questions
to be asked in establishing a base for evaluation of the licensing program
is provided,'57 it does not provide any suggestion of a research model
which the states should use to attempt to determine the extent to which
driving without a license occurs. Until such suggestions are made, the
states may make all sorts of interpretations of the evaluation language
of the standard.
On the other hand, some insight into the expected content of the
periodic review is gained from NHSB indications of the type of report
which will be expected from the states. The Manual states that a report-
ing system should encompass program operations, program manage-
ment information, and program evaluation.' 58 The NHSB intends to
ask the states for summary reports containing information similar to the
checklist in chapter IV of the Manual.' The checklist questions are
oriented toward determining the extent of state compliance with the
driver licensing standard. "'
K. Recommendations
As the above analysis makes evident, the NHSB driver licensing
standard is essentially illusory. It may be described as a "nonuniform
nonstandard." Because of its lack of precision, state programs may
vary greatly and yet meet the standard; and because the standard is so
vague, the states must confer individually with NHSB to determine
what licensing criteria will be deemed to meet the standard.
The driver licensing Manual is also generally unsatisfactory. As
has been shown, it contains little explication of most of the components
of the licensing standard. In large part, the more specific recommen-
dations which were promised are not contained in the Manual, and the
states are left largely to develop their own interpretations.
The NHSB could strengthen its driver licensing program by pro-
mulgating an amended standard more precisely stating the national
expectations, or it could amend its Manual to provide more specific
recommendations to the states. As a third alternative, the NHSB could
promulgate both a new standard and a new Manual. What is important
167Id. ch. V, at 6-11.
15lId. ch. VI, at 1.
159 ld. ch. VI, at 4.
160Id. ch. V, at 6-11.
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is that NHSB proceed to develop an improved driver licensing standard,
and it should do so with a commitment to monitor and modify both the
standard and Manual as new knowledge becomes available in ensuing
years. This is essential, for sound research may be expected to identify
new relevancies with respect to the "human factors" aspects of highway
collisions, and it may serve to expose the fallacy of current "folklore"
licensing policies as contributing nothing to the solution of the problem
of driver failure which results in highway accidents.
The commitment to monitor and modify is essential because of
our history of protecting persons from unwarranted governmental
controls on their activities. The American tradition has been to foster
liberty of the individual by limiting governmental interference when-
ever possible. Hence, through its standard-setting authority, the NHSB
may be viewed as having the responsibility of balancing the interests
of individuals against those of society in light of emerging highway
safety knowledge. Fortunately, the NHSB seems aware of this responsi-
bility; the introductory language of its driver licensing standard pro-
vides: "Each State shall have a driver licensing program: (a) to insure
that only persons physically and mentally qualified will be licensed to
operate a vehicle on the highways of the State; and (b) to prevent
needlessly removing the opportunity of the citizen to drive."'' While
the vagueness of the components of the present driver licensing standard
allows sufficient flexibility to adjust control measures to avoid unduly
restricting the need to drive, that same vagueness may permit states to
adopt licensing program policies which "needlessly" remove the oppor-
tunity to drive. This problem might be eliminated if the United States
Supreme Court, which on several occasions has recognized individual
mobility to be a Constitutionally protected interest, would also recognize
that driving an automobile is the primary means by which this mobility
is expressed.' 62 The significance of such a Supreme Court decision would
be to require state and federal governments to adopt driver control
statutes, administrative standards, and administrative procedures which
meet federal requirements of due process of law and equal protection
161 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4.
162 The right to travel has been accorded constitutional protection; e.g., Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966);
Optheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1941); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); cf. Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); Wil-
liams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). It is not to be expected
that the Court would hold motor vehicle operation to be a constitutional "liberty" or
"right" of the individual. The constitutional protection lies in mobility and not its
method. However, since the purpose of the motor vehicle is mobility, a Court decision
that driving a car is the primary means by which mobility is expressed would have the
same effect. The data collected in the APPENDIX infra leave no doubt that the motor
vehicle is, in fact, the overwhelming choice of the American public.
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of the laws. Such a holding would press the NHSB to effectively
consider all interests - individual and governmental - and thus truly
implement the introductory language of the driver licensing standard
noted above.
V. SUMMARY
In 1966, social facts were translated into formal legal policy
through congressional recognition that highway safety is a nationwide
problem. The thrust of the 1966 legislation was to inject the federal
government into the field to provide, if possible, national leadership
out of the chaos which claims more lives than the Viet Nam War.
The federal leadership is to be provided by the National Highway
Safety Bureau through its power to set national standards designed to
press states to create more effective programs to attack the problem;
through its power to approve or disapprove state programs which are
not in compliance with the national standards; and through its authority
to impose financial sanctions on states which do not adopt safety
programs which it is willing to approve.' 6"
In developing a philosophy by which to implement its powers,
the NHSB decided to promulgate broadly stated goals to which states
could aspire rather than specific standards with which the states would
be eventually expected to comply.' Yet it is arguable that Congress
expected more precision, uniformity, and strictness than the NHSB
provided; for various committee reports and other sources of legislative
history suggest that the statutory language may have been intended to
have the legal effect of pre-empting the states in certain areas.' 5 The
agency's decision appears to be based on the premise that the statute
required compliance with all NHSB standards by January 1, 1969;
a more accurate reading of the statute would permit compliance at a
later date, so long as the state is making good faith progress toward
meeting the standards.
The result of the agency's decision to develop broadly stated goals
instead of specific standards is evidenced in the NHSB driver licensing
standard.' 66 In promulgating a standard, the NHSB has the duty to
provide responsible leadership while encouraging states to upgrade and
unify their driver licensing programs. This responsible leadership would
take the form of an NHSB obligation to make a dual evaluation of its
licensing standard and state licensing program policies, based upon both
183 See § I(C) supra.
164 See § III supra.
165 See § II(B) supra.
166 See § IV supra.
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the need for greater safety on the highways and the need of individuals
to drive motor vehicles in an auto-oriented society. Such responsibility
would seem to imply the need for more precise standards in order to
achieve uniformity which, in turn, would prevent states from interfering
unduly with the need to drive.
Yet the major criticism which may be levelled at the licensing
standard is that its components are, in general, not sufficiently precise
to achieve more than a modicum of uniformity in state driver licensing
programs. Because of the vagueness of the component expressions, state
licensing programs may be widely different and yet comply with the
literal language of the standard. The broad terminology and vagueness
apparently result from the philosophy behind the NHSB standards,
which precluded use of its authority to set standards at high levels and
grant waivers for non-compliance to states which could not implement
the standards immediately.
1 67
In short, NHSB did not actually commit itself to a program of
leadership by its driver licensing standard. Hence, NHSB actually
retains broad discretion to approve or disapprove individual state driver
licensing programs on whatever criteria it chooses to apply. The lack
of precision in the standard has the effect of leaving the NHSB in
a position of great flexibility with respect to evaluation of individual
state licensing program content. Lack of commitment does not serve to
promote the strict uniformity of which Congress spoke with respect to
standard setting in the field of driver licensing. It is unfortunate that
NHSB did not provide stronger leadership in the area of driver licensing
through its standard setting function.
Despite our dissatisfaction with NHSB action in the field of driver
licensing, it would be inappropriate to fail to recognize that driver
licensing is only one facet of the total problem of highway safety which
the NHSB must confront. The driver licensing standard is only one of
thirteen standards promulgated by the NHSB in its initial attempt to
accomplish its task. It should not be assumed from these comments that
similar criticisms are inferred with respect to other aspects of the safety
agency's program. Perhaps it should be assumed that the NHSB has
met its responsibilities in other areas until analysis shows otherwise.
The crucial problem of lack of adequate funds for staffing and
research may serve in large measure to explain the relative ineffective-
ness of NHSB standard setting in the driver licensing field. For these
reasons, the question of the general success or failure of the NHSB
program remains unanswered; the jury is still out.




A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
I. URBANIZATION OF THE POPULATION
The 1960 census figures indicated that almost two of every three
Americans live in metropolitan areas.168 The population concentration
in metropolitan areas is evident in the following percentages of the
total population living in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 1900
- 32 percent; 1920-44 percent; 1940- 51 percent; 1960- 63
percent. 69 Projections of the metropolitan percentage by 1980 are in
the range of 70 percent to 80 percent.'7 The Stanford Research Institute
believes the Interstate Highway System will reinforce and accelerate
the trend toward metropolitan concentration for the reason that it
focuses on the present metropolitan areas and maximizes their acces-
sibility.'
7 '
II. URBANIZATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Since motor vehicles could be expected to be found and used
where the population is located and in view of the fact there are rela-
tively few highly populated metropolitan areas, it is interesting to note
that 54 percent of the motor vehicles registered in the United States are
located in ten states. 72 Furthermore, these ten states include thirteen
of the twenty largest metropolitan areas7'7 and account for 54 percent
of the nation's licensed drivers.' 74 In addition, the same states report
53 percent of the annual vehicle miles traveled in the nation and 61
168 THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. DEVELOPING METROPOLITAN TRANS-
PORTATION POLICIES 18 (1965) thereinafter cited as THE COMMITTEE].
19 Id. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas are defined generally as:
A county or group of contiguous counties containing at least one city of 50,000
or "twin cities" with combined populations of at least 50,000 persons. Con-
tiguous counties are included in an SMSA if they are essentially metropolitan
in character and are socially and economically integrated with the central city.
Prior to some revision in definition in 1959, these areas were designated
Standard Metropolitan Areas.
Id. at 18.
170 The 70 percent projection is by the CED staff, COMMITTEE, supra note 168, at 18.
A 75 percent projection is made by SMITH & ASSOCIATES, FUTURE HIGHWAYS AND
URBAN GROWTH iii (1961) [hereinatfer cited as SMITH & ASSOCIATES). An 80 percent
prediction is made by Rouse, Transportation and the Future of Our Cities, SYMPOSIUM-
DYNAMICS OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 2-5 (1962). See also Mylroie, Predicting the
Public's Changing Appetite for Better Transportation Facilities and Services, PLANNING
TOMORROWS STREET AND HIGHWAY SYSTEM 91 (1960).
171ALLEN & MCELYEA, IMPACT OF IMPROVED HIGHWAYS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE
UNITED STATES 86 (1958).
172UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 553 (1968) (hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF CENSUS]; accord, AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS' ASS'N, INC., AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND FIGURES 18 (1969) [herein-
after cited as AUTOMOBILE ASS'N]. The states are California, New York, Texas, Penn-
sylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Florida, and Indiana.
173 THE COMMITTEE, supra note 168, at 26.
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percent of the total urban and municipal vehicle miles.' However,
only 48 percent of the traffic deaths of 1967 occurred there.176
Empirical data is essential to an assessment of the extent to which
there is harmony between social fact and social policy. Fortunately,
some empirical studies have been made with respect to motor vehicles
which should serve to help describe those who use motor vehicles,
where the vehicles are located, and how they are used.
In general, it may be said that 79 percent of all American house-
holds (48 million) own passenger cars, and 25 percent of them own
two or more.177 Sixty-two percent of the households owning passenger
cars are in metropolitan areas and 38 percent in nonmetropolitan areas.
Of the 62 percent in metropolitan areas, 12 percent are in central
cities of more than 500,000 population, 16 percent in central cities of
less than 500,000 population, and 34 percent in suburbs of metropolitan
areas.
178
By income groups 63 percent of the nation's households earning
an income of less than $4,000 per year own passenger cars. Ownership
in the higher income groups ranges from 76 percent to 95 percent.
Privately owned passenger cars accounted for 80 percent of the
total vehicle miles traveled in 1967. Trucks accumulated 19 percent,
while all other vehicles combined accounted for 1 percent. 79 Urban
traffic alone accounted for 50 percent of the total vehicle miles, and
passenger car operation accounted for 43 percent of that 50 percent.
The significance of these figures is that 50 percent of the travel occurred
on urban streets which comprise only 14 percent of the total road mile-
age, and 37 percent occurred on main rural roads which consist of 15
percent of the road mileage. With 87 percent of all travel occurring on
29 percent of the road mileage, it is apparent that the traffic capacity
problem is concentrated in a relatively small part of the total road
mileage.
180
175 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 49; Dickerson & Corvi, Motor Vehicle Traffic
Estimates, 33 PUBLIC ROADS 148-50 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson & Corvi].
17
6
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 64 (1968 ed.). But note that BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, supra note 172, at 573, indicates that 50 percent of the traffic deaths
of 1966 occurred in these states.
177 AUTOMOBILE ASs'N, supra note 172, at 44.
178 AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, INC., AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND FIGURES
41-42 (1965). These figures are based on ALFRED POLITZ RESEARCH, INC., NATIONAL
AUTOMOBILE AND TIRE SURVEY (1964) (a sample survey sponsored by LOOK magazine).
179 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 50, based on Bureau of Public Roads, Table
VM-1, 1967; Dickerson and Corvi, supra note 175, at 150.
180 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 50, 52. The definition of urban used in this
study included areas within the political boundaries of municipalities, such as cities,
boroughs, and villages. A similar Bureau of Public Roads study of 1964, in which state
highway officials were asked to estimate the traffic in their states for 1962, defined
urban as "'an area including and adjacent to a municipality or other urban place having
a population of 5,000 or more .. " Under this narrower definition, urban traffic was
reported as 46 percent of the total vehicle mileage. See also RECK, A CAR TRAVELING
PEOPLE 31 (1960); SMITH & ASSOCIATES, supra note 170, at v.
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At the request of the Bureau of Public Roads, 24 states conducted
empirical research on the uses of passenger cars by their inhabitants
between 1951 and 1958. In addition, the Bureau of the Census con-
ducted relevant studies as a part of its 1963 Census of Transportation.
The findings tell a great deal about the purposes for which Americans
use their motor vehicles.
Combined data for the state studies show that passenger cars are
used as follows: 46 percent of the trips and 44 percent of the vehicle
miles are for earning a living, including travel to and from work, and
related business; 29 percent of the trips and 19 percent of the vehicle
miles are for family business, including medical and dental trips, shop-
ping, and miscellaneous purposes; 8 percent of the trips and 4 percent
of the vehicle miles relate to educational, civic and religious activities;
while 17 percent of the trips and 34 percent of the mileage are social
and recreational, consisting of vacations, pleasure rides, and other
purposes.
Therefore, 75 percent of the trips of the passenger car and 63
percent of its mileage are directly related to earning a living and family
business. Educational, civic and religious activities, along with social
and recreational use account for only 25 per cent of the trips, but 37
percent of the mileage.' It should be noted that rush hour congestion
is largely explained by the fact that almost half the trips and vehicle
miles are directly related to work, travel, and business. Two-thirds of
these trips occur in two or three hours of the day during the working
week as travel to and from work.'
8 2
In incorporated areas of high population density (population of
100,000 or more), the combined data indicate the following: 51 per-
cent of the trips and 48 percent of the mileage are for earning a living;
26 percent of the trips and 15 percent of the mileage are for family
business; 6 percent of the trips and 3 percent of the mileage are for
educational, civic and religious purposes; 17 percent of the trips and
34 percent of the mileage are social and recreational. Thus, in highly
populated metropolitan areas, 77 percent of the trips of the passenger
car and 63 percent of its mileage are directly related to earning a living
and family business.' 83
As for length of trip, the state studies indicated the average
distance to the first stop was 8 miles. The breakdown for the above
purpose was: earning a living - 8 miles; family business - 7 miles;
educational, civic and religious - 4 miles; social and recreational (ex-
1S8 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 40; Bostick, The Automobile in American Daily
Life, 32 PUBLIC ROADS 243 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bostick]. In these studies, a
"trip" is defined as a one-way movement from starting place to the first stop for one
of the purposes shown.
182 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 61; Bostick, supra note 181, at 241.
18 Bostick, supra note 181, at 249.
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cluding vacations) - 13 miles. Vacation trip length averaged 296
miles one way.
18 4
As has been noted, use of the passenger car for work travel is an
important part of its function. The state studies disclosed that two out
of three of the nation's workers travel to work as drivers or passengers
in cars. Fifteen percent use public transportation and 12 percent walk
to work.185 The 1963 Bureau of the Census survey indicated that of
all commuting workers, 82 percent travel by passenger car, while 14
percent use public transportation, and 4 percent use other means or
walk. In the core cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 67
percent of the commuters use cars and 29 percent use transit. Even
there, the passenger car is favored by two to one. Outside the core city,
commuters favor the passenger car by ten to one. Such widespread
selection of the passenger car is said to be due largely to the fact that
about 43 percent of the work commuters do not have ready access to
mass transit.1 86
A 1967 Bureau of the Census survey covered national travel, which
was defined as travel by one or more members of a household to and
from (a) an out-of-town place for overnight or longer or (b) a place
at least 100 miles away. It excluded travel of persons while serving as
crews, commuting trips, and travel by military personnel under orders.
The findings were that 79 percent of all such trips are by automobile,
and they account for 86 percent of the travelers.
187
III. SUMMARY
Such studies as these portray automobile ownership and use as
follows: Privately owned automobiles account for 80 percent of all
motor vehicle mileage. About half of this travel is on urban streets,
and the private automobile accounts for almost all of it. Three-fourths
of the nation's households own automobiles of which two-thirds are
owned by metropolitan area households. About one-third of the auto-
mobiles will be found in the suburbs of the great metropolitan centers,
one-third divided between metropolitan central cities of more than or
less than 500,000 persons, and one-third in rural areas.
Cars are used primarily for earning a living or for family business,
on trips between seven and eight miles in length one way. Only one out
of four car trips is for social, educational, or recreational purposes. The
18 4AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 40. A 1961 survey by the United States Bureau
of the Census showed the average trip length to be 9 miles. Its breakdown was: earning
a living- 12 miles; family business- 7 miles; educational, civic, religious- 5 miles;
social and recreational - 14 miles.
185 Bostick, supra note 181, at 243.
186 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENSUS, PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SURVEY: HOME TO
WORK TRAVEL, 1963 CENSUS OF TRANSPORTATION 76, 77 (1965); AUTOMOBILE ASS'N,
supra note 172, at 41.
187 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 37.
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car may be used on a vacation trip which will be about 300 miles one
way.
Two-thirds of the nation's workers commute to and from their
jobs. Four out of five of these commuters drive or ride in passenger
cars. Even in central cities of metropolitan areas, two out of three
commuters use cars rather than transit. Of commuters living in suburbs
of metropolitan areas, the car is used in a ten to one ratio over transit.
